afghanistan, it is very helpful. it is very enlightening. the most important transition is the security transition. the security of taking responsibility. he also i indicated the capability is better than taught, especially the stuff can of the army. provinces where they are taking place, people are not particularly worried about the transition being carried out by afghan forces. but what people are. the most and people with their biggest challenges is not some insecurity and uncertainty, will happen to the country? will happen to us? when you go and ask people -- it was a, you international

partners or of leadership on what we are transitioning, too.

taliban? where do we compromise? we have to reach these agreements as a nation, and with our allies. it goes to the other side of the table, to talk to the paula bond. that is the key for reconciliation. another issue impacting the ability of the afghan security forces is the insider attack. sometimes, people are disappointed, and say, how could this happen? how could they turn the guns against us, when we trained them? this is an important issue. as the taliban have indicated, that is their most successful tactic to undermine trust between the afghan security forces and international security forces. it is really the most effective way of destabilizing afghan

security forces. it is key to know why it is happening. the first reason is infiltration. of course, they purposefully infiltrates. we have low recruitment criteria. we do not have a strong national data system to look at who is coming in. the second part is intimidation. when people are enlisting in the force, the taliban are contacting their parents and family and threatening them. when there is violence and uncertainty, and people say the security might deteriorate, it is easy to be intimidated and switch sides. also, using uniform -- i see a lot of people who have been in kabul. you can easily buy an army uniform or police force uniform on the market. you can buy any uniform, if you are looking for it hard. rage and revenge -- sometimes, the soldiers are personally mistreated. the last item, what they call jihad, is a complex phenomenon. i will make one last point, on the number of the troops.

a lot of discussions have gone from 50,000 down to zero, but and forth. -- back and forth. it is not so much the economic constraint of the united states, or the political reality. it should be a combination of all three. first, a definition of the mission. what the united states wants to

accomplish in afghanistan. if the mission is clearly defined, we can consider this will take so many troops. i know that definition is a counter-terrorism presence, not so much counterinsurgency, which could be carried out by afghans. the question is, who is the terrorist? it is the taliban included or not? i do not want to run over my time, but i can discuss this if there is more interest. >> i think we have a comprehensive picture. you mentioned for transitions. what would be the most helpful thing, in your perspective, for

all or any of the particular transitions that outsiders could entertain? >> the most important role the international community generally could play is an economic transition. that makes the political transition possible, and the security transition sustainable. for this, what is needed is working more closely to reintegrate the afghanistan into the regional economy. this includes enhancing and building more power grids. pakistan needs power. it needs access to energy.

afghanistan needs power. if you create interdependency between these countries, especially countries that are not on friendly terms with each other, which will enhance the chances of stability to allot more more expensive projects could be pipelines and others, but at least the national grid, railroads. fortunately, pakistan is extending its railroad into kandahar. the railroad from central asia will connect now across afghanistan, north and south. we can really rebuild afghanistan as a crossroad or roundabout of trade. that is key. internally, improving access to capital in afghanistan by providing political incentives, in terms of political assurance, making more credit available for investment by international companies in afghanistan, allowing afghan companies to have access to easier credit -- these are the key issues that could help

afghanistan on the economic front. more importantly, a clear message about the future of afghanistan that would give the investors and everyone else a sense of confidence to come in and invest. >> thank you. you mentioned, for example, with respect to pakistan, that it is important for pakistan to work with afghanistan to control cross-border incidents. the thing that pakistan, along the lines ambassador jawad just mentioned, can work in other areas, like regional economics? are some of those things available to do? you mentioned not wanting to seem too eager. >> when it comes to reconciliation, i will say that pakistan has a role not because it claims to have a role, but because of demographics, because of the fact that the taliban leadership, like the

mujahideen leadership in the 1990's, happen to be in pakistan. what is it pakistan can do? we can apply some pressure, some persuasion. but if the perception is that we can arm twist anybody to accept any position, that will not be possible for pakistan. this is one point. about eagerness -- the moment you so eagerness, there are red lights everywhere. what is pakistan trying to do? for example, i made a comment that we should not be seeking a place at the table.

there is no need for us. our role is there. but if we try to say in reconciliation, we must play a part, it is certainly going to be misinterpreted, unfortunately. we have a role, and we should play the role. i think those who want us to play the role must also understand our limitations. because of the conflict in afghanistan, and a conflict which now involves pakistan, there are no difficulties. earlier, here in the 1990's, with the iran conflict, here we thought if those would get resolved, there would be communication lines open between pakistan and central asia.

there are many projects in turkmenistan, afghanistan, pakistan. if a gas pipeline could be done, that would be a great project. there are prospects for an alliance from central asia through afghanistan. there are different things that could be developed. >> jim, you have spent a fair amount of time in the situation room or in the white house. the president has talks coming up with president karzai on friday. if you were back in the situation room, developing the positions that might be suggested to him, what would be the two or three points you would make, with respect to the talks? >> as ambassador jawad

indicated, the concerns are less about security and more about uncertainty with respect to the future. i think the degree to which one can address that by laying out a future course for american engagement and for international engagement, the better. the obstacle to that, at least in part, is karzai's desire to drive the hardest burden possible. some of his objectives seem to be rather unreasonable, and even, in some cases, undesirable. this is not something that is entirely in the administration's hands. it has recently put out a statement that it is open to having no american presence at all in afghanistan, military presence, after 2014. that seems a tactic designed to indicate to karzai that he has less leverage in this

negotiation then he might otherwise. personally, i believe that it would be prudent to arrange for a fairly substantial presence, if we are able to do so. but it is important that we avoid the kind of situation we have in iraq, where we did not ask them what they thought or wanted until fairly late in the process. as a result, not only did we fail to achieve an agreement which would allow us to retain a military presence, but we also created the possibility of providing the iraqis a whole range of assistance and advisory programs through our civilian side that they did not want. as a result, we spent a lot of money and a lot of effort to create capabilities which, in the end, the iraqis did not avail themselves of. the earlier that we can come to some understanding with the afghans, difficult as it is,

about what they want, and on that basis, decide what we are prepared to provide, the better. in terms of the troop presence, my view is it is a straight cost to risk ratio. the more you are prepared to pay, the more your risk. the higher risk tolerance, the less you can get away with. you cannot have low cost and low risk. if you want to thousand troops instead of 10,000 troops, you except a much higher risk you are not going to achieve objectives to set. the minimal objective is that afghanistan will not fall to a regime linked to al qaeda of. the lower you go, the higher the risk. it may be small, but it will be higher if you chose a lower number.

i care for historic -- for my personal involvement, more about afghanistan than most americans, so i favor high-cost, low-risk. after all, i only pay $3 million. most americans are tired of it, and will probably choose high- risk, low-cost. >> i believe we are going to have microphones. if you will say your name and who question any member of the panel you like. i will start with harlan almond. >> the report that came up five years ago began, "make no mistake. nato is losing in afghanistan." was slightly softened that to say the u.s. is not winning. frankly, i am much more

pessimistic, particularly concerning the security transition. barring some wild card events -- india-pakistan, and that is not looking particularly good, or an attack on iran, which would change the calculus -- it seems to me that the level of american and western forces required to support the afghan army -- i agree the police are in a much more difficult situation -- by some counts would require in excess of 50,000 people, including contractors, because the afghan army has no air support, medical support, logistics, etc. salaries would run $4 billion a year. who is going to pay them? the obama administration is not likely to cut and run. you see signs in the press to get down to a lower level. level of 6000 is around.

if that was to take place, under the afghan security forces operate without the support in forms of air, logistics, and pay, especially when virtually every nato country wants to get out as quickly as possible? we could see a quicker decline in western presence in 2013, rather than 2014. >> would you like to discuss that first? >> this is a legitimate concern. in fact, our defense minister is in town today at the pentagon, discussing some of these issues. he has come with a detailed list of the enablers the afghan national army needs, including, as you mentioned, long-range artillery and intelligence- gathering capabilities. fixed-wing and rotary aircraft for transportation. we have been completely dependent for all of these things on nato and our other friends and allies.

again, a lot of these equipments are not as expensive as conducting these operations with nato in afghanistan. if there is a political will, it is doable. the same thing as far as the salaries of the afghan national army and police. yes, it is a significant number, considering the afghan economy. or the withdrawal of each international troops from afghanistan, we can sustain 80 afghan national army soldiers on the ground, if there is a willingness to continue with this mission. as you mentioned, to come with a more reasonable definition of success in afghanistan, which has come up to now, then diminished, what it means to succeed here in afghanistan.

>> the end of the first row, right there. >> i would really like to understand a little bit better about the indian part of this triangle. we care more about pakistan, what is going on in the arm. my understanding is that the indians are very active, and it is a triangular relationship between pakistan, india, and afghanistan. >> if you would like, ambassador? >> india has been an important friend of afghanistan, a historic friend and ally. they are not only involved in enhancing the reconstruction in afghanistan -- they are providing scholarships for more than 1000 afghans every year into different indian

universities, which is key to building human capital in afghanistan. their work actually -- in the past few years, there was some hesitation on the part of the united states, because of the hesitancy that exists in pakistan about india's role in afghanistan, not to get india involved in the training of our security forces and other issues. this is diminishing more and more, i think. there is more realism indicating that, at the end of the day, india and china are both in pakistan and have a role to play in afghanistan. there will be a partnership with india, which initially was an issue, because it was thought it might antagonize pakistan. definitely, india has a bigger role to play, provided that some of the bigger conflict that exists in our region, particularly in kashmir, are left out of this issue. at the end of the day, we think

a stable afghanistan is a better friend of pakistan. a weak and unstable afghanistan will in danger pakistan as much as afghanistan. india is providing more than $2 billion of economic assistance. they are getting more interested to get involved in training of the afghan security forces in a professional level, like the police and others, not so much the afghan national army, which needs to continue either through the united states or some of our nato partners, to provide the continuity of what we have started together. >> do you want to say a few words? >> i essentially agree with the ambassador that a stable afghanistan is in the best interest of pakistan and the region. whatever can be done to accelerate the process of stabilization must be done.

as you have also mentioned earlier, he what the international community can do, and pakistan and india can also do, is contribute to economic development. whatever india is doing, pakistan simply cannot have any reservations to that. pakistan herself is also doing. we have scholarships we offer. we have also these refugees. we would like that they should go back, but they continue to be in pakistan, more than 3 million. one aspect is the army. if the indians start training the afghan army, there are concerns. they should be understandable. they should be appreciated. why the afghan army cannot be

trained by nato, for example? one not countries like turkey, or the united states? why do we have to have something the, where people in pakistan, some people, rightly or wrongly, say we are facing a difficult situation? that is why we have a concern. apart from that, nothing else. >> second row, over here. >> hello? mr. jawad, my name is -- >> you are ok. >> director of operations at the world bank. i like your comment that economic prosperity is probably

the most important aspect of the transition. we are speaking about long-term schemes. in rehabilitation of countries, the world bank has taken a lead, oftentimes, in countries in latin america, eastern europe, and many others, and even in pakistan. short-term schemes will development. social development schemes have been put into action which have a lead time for results which are very much shorter than you talk about. to what extent, in afghanistan, have those kinds of schemes and applied? to my mind, in addition to the parallel track with the long schemes, we need shorter schemes, which addresses some of the other concerns about security. wherever there is poverty and lack of opportunity, that is an opening for the taliban to show

their bid. to what extent is afghanistan focusing on short-term development schemes? >> that is a very good point. as you know, when you implement large-scale infrastructure projects, there is no community that relates to them right away. therefore, it is more expensive to maintain them. if you build a highway, you had no communities along the road that says, "this is my road." you have to create a need that the community thinks, this is my project, and this is for me, and i see myself reflected in that. the world bank assistance to create the solidarity program of rural development, which was projects designed based on the priority of the community.

there was a development -- they are still around, these development councils. money has been provided to them by the afghan government. but the construction and oversight is done by the community. they feel responsible to it. those undertakings are very important. they are key. of course, sometimes, they have their own challenges. when you work at the community level in a lot of these projects being implemented, sometimes, the community might tolerate the presence of the taliban on the project. the donor community says, how could you do this? we give you the money, and you still allow the taliban to be around this. this is a harder balance to

reach. but there is absolutely -- the microfinance projects have been good not only for empowerment, but also for gender equality. that has been a model in afghanistan, to reach out to smaller rural communities. >> the back row. >> thank you. i run the u.s.-indian security forum. my question is directed toward the ambassador. the first is a comment. the indo-afghan strategic partnership was signed with mutual hesitation by both parties. nobody rushed into it. that is when,. my question is related to the ethnic composition and the training and support of the army, which ambassador kahn objects to india's role in it. can you comment on afghanistan's role in it? >> i would like to talk about nato's role, longer term.

when the recruitment process started and the security situation was not as challenging as it is today, a lot of the people and listed from the provinces many from the south and north, and some of the leadership of the ministry of defense belong to the people of the north. in the beginning there was some imbalances and the composition and formation of the ministry of defense in the afghan security forces. there is a system in place and extensive efforts to recruit from the provinces of the south. some of these efforts are successful. as you can imagine if you put yourself as chairman in afghanistan, if you enlist as an afghan, you face different

levels of [inaudible] the province is quiet. the taliban are not operating. there's less threat against you and your family. therefore despite the inferences being made, we still have challenges to recruit a member -- members of the security forces from those provinces. we purposely go and try to recruit students from the south or places [indiscernible] since the school system was not to this standard, i does not matter. we're not successful to bring them as much as we want. >> do you want to talk about these issues? >> in terms of who revises the afghan national army, in 2001, we had a plethora of offers. the pakistani, the indian, and

the iranian fradkin to me and said it wanted to collaborate. i thought that we ought to try to devise some arrangement in which i and some limited aspects, countries could participate. others in the others in the administration were opposed to any iranian role. relations between pakistan and india were at a nadir. coincident with 9/11 and the subsequent bond process, a pakistani base -- terrorist group had conducted a large- scale terrorist attack on the indian parliament. the countries were close to war. very close to war. the idea that they would collaborate in some joint venture in afghanistan was more difficult to conceive then that might be now.

relations have to some degree improved. i do not think that india and pakistan between them would be able to substitute for the kind of assistance -- [indiscernible] for some time to come. to the extent the country's -- countries could agree on some form of joint collaboration, i would not oppose it. but neither would i look to it to shoulder much of the load in the short to medium term. >> front row. >> i write the mitchell reports and also councilmember. fassel -- i wanted to ask the

ambassador about his observations about cost and risk. and to do that in the context of american domestic political setting, just to say that 2014 is not just another year. it is midterms. i wonder if there is a way, if you have done this or could articulate what the risks that you talk about are, and to the extent that it is doable. some sense of risk investment ratioso that people can get some more specificity than saying there is this relationship between risk and cost. it is to delineate what those risks might be and i in round numbers investments on our

resources could be to deal with those. >> level one is we're no longer able to mount operations that suppress terrorist activity in pakistan or afghanistan. employing drones and other forms of counter terrorist strikes. that we can do that only as long as we have a complaint government that is prepared to for that purpose it is not something we can do from aircraft carriers in the indian ocean. it is not something we will do from uzbekistan. if we do not have a government in kabul is cooperative, those kinds of activities will go way and the abilities -- ability to suppress groups that are prepared and would like to target the united states and

american allies around the world would be degraded. that is a risk one. the second level of risk is if you could return to a situation in which those kinds of terrorists were able to operate not clandestinely within a state which has weak capacity to suppress them but in a state that is actively collaborating and is prepared to put its facilities at their disposal. before 9/11, al qaeda hijacked a state. they hijacked afghanistan. afghanistan was alive. that is different from its relationship with pakistan or yemen or somalia. where they operate essentially either in an area with no state

or in a state that is hostile to them. but isn't capable of suppressing them to the degree we would like. operating within a state that is actively compliant, obviously, considerably expands their capacity to plan and mount large-scale terrorist operations as we found in september 2001. the worst of all situations is the taliban remain linked to al qaeda and they come back and govern the country. that is something -- the risk of that i do not put that very high. i do not put the cost of reducing that risk further very high, either. if there is as 5% but you could reduce it by spending $4 billion a year, i would argue that is worth $4 billion. other people i would argue what did 9/11 cost us? we could lose a couple of buildings every decade. and a few thousand citizens rather than losing much larger amounts of money.

they will come to a different risk calculations. i do not know if you can reduce this to x% risk and a certain amount of dollars. >> i want to make one comment. there is this concern that a television type might-- taliban type government might return. to my mind there is no such possibility. afghanistan has changed and the investor had mentioned how the preoccupations have changed. i have not been a frequent visitor but i have seen them in the taliban days and i was last year in afghanistan. the activity that is going on, there is a resilience now. which will not allow the taliban

to return. the taliban, the country was hijacked by al qaeda. the government was completely ostracized. there was not a single government except pakistan. it was living in a time warp. therefore, it was possible for al qaeda to be the master of taliban leadership and have a free hand over -- i do not think that kind of situation is able to return. now that the world is focused on afghanistan. >> i would prepare to spend a few billion dollars to make sure. >> thank you. i work for voice of america.

thanks for the discussion and insight. the first question is the presence of the u.s. troops. there is a possibility that came out yesterday, how will be perceived in pakistan and you're trying to reject the taliban government. where did you see them, on the mountains or on the streets of kabul? we do not see a better political setup in afghanistan from that side. where do you see them, then? thank you. >> the first question about how well pakistan -- will pakistan see the continued u.s. presence,

there is one pakistan government and my anticipation is there will except the agreement at the u.s. government. this is basically a problem between these two governments. pakistan is not a monolith. there is all kinds of spectrums in pakistan. i think also -- who believe the presence of foreign troops is also the sustaining argument of the militants. they must continue as long as the foreign forces are there. and therefore as i had said,

there would be this perception that the continuation may also mean the continuation of these kinds of activities. the counter argument that these activities must stop may be weakened. these are various groups, various parties who have those kinds of views. i anticipate that the government will be accepting. the other thing is where the taliban if they're not here? do not say that they're only in pakistan. in paris there has been a taliban representation. the taliban as part of the political landscape.

this is basically something that should be done by the peace council. pakistan gets involved and your will say that there's a classic but, i read it a long time ago. i off and on read it. to remind myself how intertwined is the history and culture and tradition and demographic of these countries. sometimes our problems become your problems and your problems become our problems. >> do you want to comment on that? >> on the question i think in the contacts that take place between the pakistani army and the government, the army position is -- [indiscernible] they have bigger plans and other intentions.

in the private meeting that is where the position is. the smaller u.s. presence probably will come. there might be concerned. as the ambassador indicated, there are many other forces in pakistan that may have concern about the impact of the duration of security in afghanistan which leads into [indiscernible] in pakistan. in the past in the private meetings, the idea was we're not sure when the attention is focused on afghanistan and pakistan started out with themselves and help to get the americans out of here. >> my question is for the ambassador. it is the follow-up to the

previous question. in your remarks, pakistan still pursues a policy of strategic [indiscernible] in afghanistan. with that in mind, you also mentioned there is some unrealistic expectations from afghanistan and the united states with respect to pakistan's future role in reaching out to some of the taliban, especially the taliban leadership. it props up against u.s. and afghan forces in afghanistan. you said there are some limitations. what are those limitations? >> the limitation is what i had mentioned. we should not be expected to deliver the taliban leadership to a position that maybe will -- you may be wanting them to take. that would not be possible for us.

i said that we have quite an experience of interacting with [indiscernible] and they never agreed to pakistan's point of view. this applied to the leadership and the taliban themselves. when they were rolling afghanistan. to expect that pakistan should be able to make them except, for example, the renne constitution, we will not be able to do that. this will be between the harpies council and the taliban and how the taliban are dealt with. this is for iran. they are debilitated and this is the way to proceed toward reconciliation. [indiscernible] that is for the renne leadership.

pakistan should not be expected we encourage them to be part of the process. we are trying to do probably now, we should do that. the other thing he mentioned about this strategy? -- depth, they have no chance of getting in a government controlling of afghanistan. in the -- even in the 1990's when they were strong. now the relationship has completely changed. how can there be -- it does not work out and this was never a policy.

we never saw them. we did not go after them. we did not count them likely how did al qaeda. almost all the guantanamo bay detainees were captured in pakistan with the help of the pakistani. we treated them differently. as we mentioned, we wanted them to be part of the process in beginning. the strategy depth, it was in nonsensical idea. he did not explain it. afterward there had been a retreat but there has never been this phrase has never been part of the policy statement ever.

this has been very catchy and all that has come about, pakistan is seeking strategy dabs. how can we seek a strategy depth when the security threat is through india. >> my question relates to any joke. apart from the regular discussion nato has on withdrawal, the new mission post 2014, there is a great deal of effort into trying to push regional cooperation post-2014. this has proven to be rather difficult, engaging central asians and figuring out a role for russia. i was wondering from the three panelists whether you see some role for nato, some value added to push the regional cooperation

through partnership policies. whether that is something that would be useful. thank you. >> there have been a number of summits and high-level meetings over the last couple of years that have established a rhetorical from work and also a framework for support for conciliation. i think that is helpful. i think it is worth continuing to push in this regard. there has been some improvement in relations between india and pakistan. the border has been open to commerce in a way it was not before. these are fairly important elements. nato is a political role is of somewhat limited importance in

terms of its influence. it certainly is worth pursuing. >> would pakistan sea of positive role? >> [indiscernible] what is the role that nato sees for itself? is that military when we talk about nato? is it economic? is it political? nato does not appear to wear so many hats. when we talk about nato, we're talking about military. that has already been discussed but certainly other organizations, everyone has an important political and economic role. i think nato can also help support the iraq army to do a better job.

we're in favor of that. there was one mention about india and the transit train. that will come at a certain point. there are some things if only the conflict situation gets resolved in afghanistan. >> your question was on the role in northern afghanistan. this is a key important way of connecting afghanistan to the rest of the world. that is important for us to reduce dependency on other transit trials that are becoming important in afghanistan. definitely nato countries have a more important role to play then nato as an organization. a lot of activity about nato activity is an organization in central asia. they do -- if the rules are conducted like a government of france or germany, or other allies, it is more effective.

the vehicle should be different because they have influence and they can help out by connecting afghanistan to the rest of the world. when the route was to terman, the call that the no. distribution network. my favorite term as the silk road. this is reviving its traditional role. >> i am with the embassy here. i have a question to the ambassador regarding economic

development. it seems to be extremely important. fighting [indiscernible] in afghanistan and in the region. this aspect will affect the economic transition for and development and the eventual successful outcome. could you talk about what is the current state of affairs as far as what tools are being employed and how do you see this as being successfully battled for the future economic development in afghanistan? thank you. >> the interment of the -- environment of the narcotrafficker forces in uncertainty. when they raise an orchard or vineyard and turns it into a poppy field -- when he is not sure what is learned happened to him or his family, they turn to narcotics.

it takes three months to grow it. it does not need refrigeration or economic integration, nothing. if we see an increased degree of uncertainty, we would probably see more poppy cultivation. it would be listed economic activities. -- illicit economic activities. the leadership [indiscernible] in the areas where the economy is thriving, we have seen a reduction of narcotics and cultivation of the poppy. in areas where we see most of the fighting, that is where most of the poppies are grown. >> let me close with a final question. jim used a number of statistics.

one that struck me is i have the right to a 52% of the afghan population thought the country is going on in the right direction. my question to each of you, what is your view? is the country going in the right direction and are you optimistic or pessimistic as we look forward for the next two years and after 2014? >> if you do not know where you are going, any road will take you there. the country is going in the right direction compared to where we started certainly. people feel more confident about the way their life is conducted. also as i mentioned, there has to be a bit of a relation [indiscernible] in the region.

>> i also agree and the statistics were new to me. it is heartening that 52% of people in afghanistan feel the country is going in the right direction. i do not know the figures for pakistan. one other thing. some of the preoccupations in terms of thinking and concerns which the investor mentioned, what is the future of the country? where does it stand with the international community? these are common questions which are asked in any other normal society especially in the region. this is a very positive sign. the situation may be floated, there are definite positive signs and i experienced them when i visited last year.

it was a different afghanistan that i visited five or six years ago. >> most of the trend lines are positive. the ones that you can detect using empirical data. i'm not sure that the trend lines of american policy are quite so positive. there is an interaction between the two. to end with a few other statistics, the situation has changed since 2001. today 4/5 of afghan households have [indiscernible] one half have tv's and three- quarters of afghan households have telephones. the statistics, for radius they may have been fairly high. for tvs and telephones they

would have been zero. there connected with each other and with the rest of the world in ways that are completely different from where they were 10 years ago. on balance that is positive. >> let me thank the panel, each of whom has been positive in terms of a thoughtful and useful presentation. we appreciate it. thank you for coming and we're concluded. thank you very much. [applause]>> next, your live

calls and comments on " washington journal." after that, remarks by public and afghan president karzai. >> if you ask how many people described themselves as libertarian, depending on which poll you look at, you might edit around 15%. if you give people a battery of questions about different ideological things. then you track those two different ideologies, depending on which poll, you get up to maybe 30% of americans calling themselves libertarian. if you ask the following question, are you economically conservative but socially liberal, that is over half americans calling themselves -- saying that is what they are.

just to give this a them to us not mean that they believe them. americans, do you want smaller government? they say yes. if you ask them to cut any particular item on the budget, they do not want to cut anything. it is not clear if they really believe in it. ,'ve had to say that roughly as low as 10% and as high as 30%. libertarians, if they were conscious and political, they could he a big movement. they could have a lot of influence in politics. for various reasons, they are organized i wear it now. >> a political primer and libertarianism. tonight at eight o'clock. >> this morning, steve clemons and jerry schmidt discuss